• If I didn’t have Baseball-Reference.com to tell me different, I’d have assumed Aubrey Huff wasn’t an everyday first baseman from the way he played last night. He was competent and made some nice picks, but he didn’t seem to have the ankle-preservation instinct that most everyday 1Bs do. He seemed to have his heels back quite far on the bag most of the time.

• The rumors about the Yankees pursuing Cliff Lee strike me as cartoonish supervillainy. “If I cannot defeat you, I will simply BUY you!”

• Game 3 was the Lee vs. Tim Lincecum gem that we all assumed Game 1 would be.

• Somewhere, Bengie Molina is secretly pouring champagne all over himself.

• If the postseason came before voting, Buster Posey would be a lock for Rookie of the

A walk-off beaning requires an extraordinary set of circumstances. First of all, like all walk-off plays, it requires the home team to be at bat in the bottom of the inning. In this case, it was in extra innings rather than the bottom of the 9th. It additionally requires a tied game in the bottom of said inning. Finally, it requires the bases to be loaded when the plunking occurs.

This is all magnified by the face that Rivera does not ordinarily load the bases. Assuming his 2010 OBP against (.214) held, the probability the bases being loaded with two outs or fewer is:

Then, if that situation occurs, we still have to deal with the unlikely event of Mariano hitting a player with a pitch. Before this evening, Mo had hit three batters in 196 plate appearances, for a rate of about .0153. Thus, the probability of Mariano Rivera hitting a batter with a pitch after having loaded the bases is

That means that in 10,000 innings, we would expect that to occur about 4 times, assuming that Mariano wasn’t removed after having walked the bases (which would obviously introduce some bias).

Oddly, the last walk-off hit by pitch also involved the Yankees, albeit on the other side, way back on July 19 of 2008. That night, the A’s’ Lenny DiNardo hit Jose Molina with a pitch to force in Derek Jeter, again in extra innings. David Robertson grabbed the win that night.

During the first 93 games of the season, the Yankees hit 109 home runs in 3660 plate appearances for rates of 1.17 home runs per game and .0298 home runs per plate appearance. From July 23 to August 3, they hit 17 home runs in 451 plate appearances over 12 games for rates of 1.42 home runs per game and .0377 home runs per plate appearances. Obviously those numbers are quite a bit higher than expected, but can it be due simply to chance?

Assume for the moment that the first 93 games represent the team’s true production capabilities. Then, using the binomial distribution, the likelihood of hitting at least 17 home runs in 451 plate appearances is

The cumulative probability is about .868, meaning the probability of hitting 17 or fewer home runs is .868 and the probability of hitting more than that is about .132. The probability of hitting 16 or fewer is .805, which means out of 100 strings of 451 plate appearances about 81 of them should end with 16 or fewer plate appearances. This is a perfectly reasonable number and not inherently indicative of a special performance by A-Rod’s teammates.

Kaye frequently cited Mark Teixeira and Robinson Cano as upping their games. Teixeira hit 18 home runs over the first 93 games and made 423 plate appearances for rates of .194 home runs per game and .0426 home runs per plate appearance. From July 23 to August 3, he had 5 home runs in 12 games and 54 plate appearances for rates of .417 per game and .0926. That rate of home runs per plate appearance is about 8% likely, meaning that either Teixeira did up his game considerably or he was exceptionally lucky.

Cano played 92 games up to July 21, hitting 18 home runs in 400 plate appearances for rates of .196 home runs per game and .045 per plate appearance. During A-Rod’s drought, he hit 3 home runs in 50 plate appearances over 12 games for rates of .25 and .06. That per-plate-appearance rate is about 39% likely, which means we don’t have enough evidence to reject the idea that Cano’s performance (though better than usual) is just a random fluctuation.

It will be interesting to see if Teixeira slows down as a home-run hitter now that Rodriguez’s drought is over.

Over 2008-2009, Alex played in 262 games and had 1129 plate appearances with 281 hits, 65 home runs, a triple:double ratio of 1:50, an OBP of .397, and a SLG of .553. His OBP has a margin of error of .0146, so we can be 95% confident that over those years his baseline production would be somewhere between .368 and .426 and absent any time or age effect that is the range in which A-Rod should produce for any given period.

Two recent milestone home runs come to mind as examples of Rodriguez’s reputed choking. First, the stretch between home run #499 and #500 was 8 games and 36 plate appearances. (I’m intentionally ignoring extra plate appearances on the days he hit #499 and #500.) During that time, Alex had an OBP of only .306. That’s a difference of .091 over 36 plate appearances and that performance has a standard error of about .078 when compared with his regular performance, implying a t-value of about 1.16. With 35 degrees of freedom, Texas A&M’s t Calculator gives a p-value of about .127, so this difference is marginally within the realm of chance. (The usual cutoff for significance would be .05.)

A-Rod hit his last home run on July 22. Discounting the plate appearances after his last home run, he’s played in 11 games with a paltry .255 OBP and .238 SLG over 47 plate appearances. His .255 OBP has a difference of about .142 and a standard error of about .064. That implies a t-value of about 2.21, with a p-value of about .016. That is, the probability of this difference occurring by chance is less than 2%. That gives us one result as close to significant and one as probably significant.

As a side note, A-Rod’s Choke Index continues to rise. He’s gone 48 plate appearances without a home run, and at a rate of .055 home runs per plate appearance the probability of that occurring by chance is about .066. That leaves his Choke Index at .934.

First of all, in the top of the ninth inning, corner infielder Andy Marte pitched for the Indians. Marte pitched a perfect ninth and coincidentally struck out Nick Swisher, who was brought in to pitch for the Yankees in a similar situation last year and struck out Gabe Kapler of the Tampa Bay Rays. I can’t promise it’s true, but I think that puts Swisher at the top of the list for involvement in position player pitcher strikeouts.

Marte’s presence was necessary because the Indians used seven other pitchers. Starter Mitch Talbot went only two innings, and the Indians got another two out of Rafael Perez. Frank Hermann took the loss for the Indians during his 1 1/3 innings. Tony Sipp pitched another 1 1/3, and Joe Smith managed to give up four earned runs in 1/3 of an inning before being removed for Jess Todd for an inning. In the bottom of the 9th, Marte was all the Indians had left.

Not to be outdone, Joe Girardi gave up his designated hitter by moving his DH – funnily enough, it was Swisher – into right field as part of a triple switch. Swisher moved to right field; Colin Curtis moved from right field to left field; Marcus Thames moved from left field to third base;  finally, pitcher Chan Ho Park was put into the batting order in place of Alex Rodriguez, who came out of the game.

Finally, A-Rod is up to 33 plate appearances without a home run. Assuming his standard rate of .064 home runs per plate appearance, the likelihood of this happening by chance is . I stand by my belief that there’s something other than chance (i.e. distraction or other mental factors) causing Rodriguez’s hitting to suffer.

Last year, there were 51 leadoff home runs over roughly 6 months (early April through the first week of October), which puts uniformly distributed homers at  8.5 per month (so McLouth’s #19 on June 19 was about 2.25 behind pace). So far, with eleven over 2.5 months, that puts us on pace for 26.4, or, to be generous, about 30 leadoff home runs.

The change probably isn’t indicative of anything other than chance, but in 2008 #24 of 52 came on June 20, and in 2007 they were already up to 28 of 59 by June 19. Over the past few years there’s been a slowing of leadoff home runs which may be due to chance or may be due to some other factor. Who knows? It’s way too small a sample to say anything about.

In addition, Scioscia started Joe Saunders. This isn’t a crime in and of itself. However, in the ALCS, he started John Lackey, Saunders, Jered Weaver, and Scott Kazmir. Girardi, meanwhile, is using Joe Torre’s time-honored trick of carrying only three starters (CC Sabathia, Andy Pettitte, and AJ Burnett) and using traditional long-relief men like Dan Robertson in addition to standard situational relief like Joba Chamberlain, Damaso Marte, and Mariano Rivera. In Game 6, Saunders went only 3.1 innings. Weaver performed well in relief and, frankly, should have been left there for the duration of the series. Instead, Scioscia spread his men too thin and was left making an all-hands-on-deck call in the late games where he used both Weaver and Kazmir in relief. Saunders pitched brilliantly in Game 2, and Scioscia should have been prepared to maximize his usage of Lackey, Saunders, and Kazmir while leaving Weaver in the bullpen. Granted, Saunders pitched like crap last night, but all pitchers have their off nights.

Finally, Girardi will probably do quite well in the World Series, as he’s experienced in managing under National League rules. Hideki Matsui, with his legs in bad shape, will be almost entirely useless in the Phillies’ park. In a perfect world, Girardi would be able to dump fifth-outfielder Freddy Guzman and use Matsui in the field. However, that seems unlikely, so Matsui will remain an overpaid pinch-hitter. With Jerry Hairston, Jr., on the bench, Guzman’s utility as a pinch runner is moderate at best. It would be a gutsy move, but I think Girardi would do best to dump Guzman and bring Shelley Duncan in as a pinch hitter and emergency outfielder.

Still, Girardi gets paid the big bucks to do his job, so I’m sure every move he makes is well-considered.

No, of course not. Find out why behind the cut.

It’s a tempting story – that a secret, untapped pitching ability lurks inside players known more for their bats, and the idea that someone playing in the outfield could be the world’s greatest reliever if only they’d give him the chance. Scott Spiezio pitched once for the St. Louis Cardinals and has a facebook group dedicated to his pitching prowess.

The problem is that a position player pitching has two advantages, one much stronger than the other. The weak advantage is that there’s no chance to scout a position player before he pitches, with the possible exception of a known pitching threat like Wade Boggs. Even then, it’s difficult to know what the player has been holding back. The strong advantage is that, well, position players aren’t very good pitchers.

How does that work? Intuitively, a major-league batter is used to a pitcher performing at a high level. Once he’s warmed up, he has a set of skills maximized for hitting a 90-plus-mile-per-hour ball thrown at him. Timing has become second nature. This is why changeups are so effective – a player isn’t expecting a ball being hurled slowly at him, and so he swings as if a fastball were coming. Being thrown nonstop changeups (which is effectively what a position player will do, given that he doesn’t regularly practice pitching) is jarring and will throw off the batter’s concentration. To a lesser extent, this is seen when a left-handed pitcher relieves a right-handed pitcher.

Does that make sense? Let’s make the assumption that a player at the major league level will be used where his manager assumes he will make the strongest contribution to the team, as constrained by the rest of the talent available. Thus, while Swish would make a perfectly cromulent designated hitter on some teams, and plays enough first base to be a starter for some clubs, his best fit for the Yankees is playing the corners in the outfield. It would be economically inefficient and thus irrational for Joe Girardi to start him at, say, shortstop, because he has a better shortstop (Cody Ransom).

So, almost entirely because Swisher is an outfielder, we can assume that he cannot pitch at the major league level. Unpacking this, he lacks some quality – consistency, endurance, speed, control, something like that – and therefore cannot be a consistently good pitcher. However, the payoff of using a player who can’t pitch consistently shrinks in emergency relief situations, since the cost of exhausting a real reliever outweighs the expected cost of using a non-pitcher to pitch (in most cases, giving up a few runs). However, as an outfielder, we know he has the arm strength to throw the ball. (This also explains why catchers, who have to have strong throwing arms and throwing reflexes, are often used as emergency relievers.) So, given that it makes economic sense to use Swisher instead of using, say, Mariano Rivera simply to fulfill the idea that only a relief pitcher should be used as a relief pitcher, it also makes sense that Swisher will perform somewhat well. He lacks only some of the qualities of a good pitcher, not all of them. Once you factor in the lack of preparation that the Rays had to face a jarring series of changeups, and the difficulty of making that mental adjustment, it is perfectly sensible to expect Swisher to have a good outing.

So why doesn’t Swish pitch every night? For the simple reason that if players expect to face a slow-hurling outfielder every night, there would be practice time dedicated to hitting 75-mile-per-hour fastballs. It would then become inefficient to use Swisher, when a harder-throwing real reliever could get outs with greater predictability.

Sorry, Swish. Great outing, but we won’t be using you again for a while.

Nick Swisher can pitch
Struck out Kapler with a change
Now stay in the field.